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Abstract
We consider an important family of cryptographic protocols and a class of security properties
which encompasses secrecy and authentication. We show that it is always su"cient to consider
a bounded number of agents b (b = 2 for secrecy properties for example): if there is an attack
involving n agents, then there is an attack involving at most b agents.
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1. Introduction
The task of automatically verifying cryptographic protocols has now been undertaken
by several research groups, because of its relevance to secure internet transactions. Let
us cite for instance (this is far from being exhaustive): CAPSL [15], CASRUL=Datac
[21], casper=FDR [29].
Though cryptographic protocols are often described in a concise way (see e.g. [8]),
the veriBcation problem is di"cult for two reasons:
1. The protocol descriptions contain free variables called roles, which may be instanti-
ated by any identities thereafter called agents. A protocol may be executed several
times: we get several protocol sessions. Both the number of agents and the number
of sessions are unbounded.
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2. We assume the presence of an attacker which may record and analyze the messages
sent through the net and which may forge and send new messages. The size of
messages which can be forged by an intruder is also unbounded.
And, in fact, even for simple properties such as secrecy and for subclasses of pro-
tocols, the veriBcation problem is undecidable (see e.g. [17,16,10,3]).
The veriBcation tools have either to assume stronger properties on the protocols (e.g.
[23,11,30,3]) or to consider a bounded number of sessions (hence a bounded number of
agents) only [4,28,18,25], in which case the security problem becomes co-NP-complete
[28]. Yet another solution is to consider an upper approximation of the set of execution
sequences, in such a way that, when no attack is found on this upper approximation,
then there is no attack on the protocol. This is typically the approach of [7,6].
In this paper, we consider a simple reduction, which works for any protocols and
security properties typically considered for automated veriBcation. We show that it is
always su"cient to consider a bounded number of agents b (actually b=2 for secrecy
properties; we will discuss this point later): if there is an attack involving n agents,
then there is an attack involving at most b agents. Such a result is useful for automatic
tools: we may forget the universal quantiBcations on agent ids and consider Bnitely
many instances of the protocol roles, without losing information. This actually proves
that the instantiation techniques in [21] are complete. This also provides completeness
results for abstraction used in [7,26]. Of course, the veriBcation problem will remain
undecidable, because we cannot faithfully give a bound on the number of sessions.
Still, approximation techniques such as [6,7] can be simpliBed and when considering
a bounded number of sessions we may assume w.l.o.g. that only these b agents are
involved. This reduction result also provides a decision result for cryptographic proto-
cols against a passive intruder, provided the messages are labeled by a nonce session
and a rule number (which is often the case of implemented protocols).
Our result extends and clariBes a side result of [20]. Indeed, J. Heather and S.
Schneider show that one may consider only four agents (three honest, one dishonest)
using implicitly that an agent may talk to herself. We actually prove that in J. Heather
and S. Schneider’s setting, only two agents are su"cient. In addition, our reduction
result holds for more general security properties and also holds when an agent is
disallowed to speak with herself.
The proof of our result is not di"cult, once the protocol and its properties are ex-
pressed as Horn clauses: given an attack against a secrecy property, we simply project
every honest identity on one single honest identity and every dishonest identity on one
single dishonest identity. For more general security properties like authentication, we
need k+1 agents where k is the number of agents variables used in the security prop-
erty. Actually, the result can be stated for a class of Horn clauses, which encompasses
protocols descriptions. Everybody has her (his) favorite model. We do not argue that
the Horn clause model is better than others. However, this model has two advantages
for the setting of our result:
1. We do not need to deBne precisely the intruder power: our result holds for any
intruder provided it satisBes some slight hypotheses, deBned in our model. In par-
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ticular, our reduction also holds considering the usual equational theories associated
to the exclusive or, modular exponentiation, etc.
2. For conditional security properties of the form “if  then  ”, we show that the
reduction still holds when the negation of the property  can be expressed in Horn
clauses, which is the case for authentication. Horn clauses are therefore an appro-
priate model to express the class of properties for which the reduction holds.
We claim that most other models can be reduced to this one, hence our reduction
also applies to other models of cryptographic protocols. In order to support this claim,
we provide (in [13]) a reduction of the Millen–RueO model [24] to Horn clauses, while
keeping the number of agents involved in an attack. We hope that this will provide
enough evidence that the reduction result works for other models as well. (It is not
possible to show in detail all reductions from other models to Horn clauses).
Our paper is organized as follows. We introduce our model in Section 2. In Sec-
tion 3.1 we prove that, if there is an attack involving n agents, then there is an attack
involving at most two agents, besides the constant agents which might be used in the
protocol description. In other words, we show that we have to consider only instances
of the roles in a two-element set. This is quite intuitive since the protocols never re-
fer to the representation of agents identities: they are indeed irrelevant when verifying
properties of cryptographic protocols. However, the formal proof of this result reveals
two assumptions. First, the same agent may play diPerent roles in a given protocol
session: “an agent may talk to herself”. Most of the models do not discard this ability.
However, it may be considered as more realistic that an agent cannot play several
roles in the same session. Some models [27,23] explicitly disallow this possibility. In
addition, this reduction result holds only for properties expressed as purely negative
clauses, which is not the case of authentication properties. That is why we consider
in Section 3.2 more general security properties and models in which an agent may be
forbidden to talk with herself. We prove in this case that, if there is an attack involving
n agents, then there is an attack involving at most k +1 agents where k is the number
of agent variables occurring in the security property.
2. The model
We deBne a trace model by means of Horn clauses, in which terms are messages. A
similar representation can also be found in [6] for instance. The important feature is that
we only use Horn clauses, which contain at least one positive literal. Hence there is a
least Herbrand model H, which is the intended trace semantics: the possible traces are
the members of TH, the interpretation of the unary predicate T in H. Clauses come in
two parts: the Brst part is protocol independent and the second part is protocol speciBc.
2.1. Messages and traces
We consider a set of (ground) terms built over a set of function symbols F
and basic sorts: Num;Agent;Ha;Da;Message; Event; Trace. F contains the following
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function symbols:
0 : → Num ni : Agentki ;Num → Message
s : Num → Num st : Agent;Num;Num;Message → Event
h : → Ha ⊥: → Trace
d : → Da [ ; ] · : Event;Num;Trace → Trace
sh : Ha → Ha srvi : → Agent
sd : Da → Da
Terms of sort Agent are called agents, terms of sort Message are called messages.
All other symbols, including the classical cryptographic primitives for building keys,
encryption and pairs take messages as arguments and return a message. This set of
cryptographic primitives is denoted by
Fmsg = {〈 ; 〉; { } ; pub( ); prv( ); shr( )}:
In addition, we may have e.g. hash function symbols.
We also assume that every agent is a message and every message is an event; we
have the subsort relations Agent6Message6Event, Ha6Agent and Da6Agent. Let
us comment a little bit:
• Num is only used for internal representations of session numbers, nonces, etc. It
is important to provide one representation since we will consider Herbrand models.
However, such a representation is irrelevant in what follows. In particular, neither
the intruder nor the agents have access to this representation.
• There are two non-standard sorts Da;Ha. The terms of these sorts are, respectively,
skd(d) and s
k
h (h) and are intended to represent compromised and honest agents re-
spectively. Again, this is for internal representation only. Of course, this distinction
is never used in the protocol description. It is however necessary in the protocol
property deBnition: typically, we want to state that a secret shared by honest agents
remains unknown to the intruder, hence we need a way to express that an agent is
honest. The use of sd; sh as a mean to represent agents identities is arbitrary. It could
be replaced with any other representation.
• srvi are intended to be server names. They are constant names in the protocols, they
will not be counted in the number of agents needed for an attack.
• ni is a collection of function symbols, which are used to represent nonces (randomly
generated data): ni is intended to take as arguments some agent ids (who generates
the nonce and who are supposed to receive the nonce) and a session number. i is
intended to be the protocol step. Note that we may also consider a single symbol n
with an additional argument i. Then ni( ) is simply a notation for n(i; ).
• st is intended to represent the local state of an agent: the term st(a; i; j; m) repre-
sents the agent a being at the jth step of the role i and having the message m in
his memory. Events will consist of either sending a message or increasing a local
memory. Traces are sequences of pairs of an event and a session number.
• We do not assume any a priori typing of messages (there is no a priori way to
distinguish between a nonce and a pair for instance), though any such policy could
be speciBed at the protocol description level.
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By abuse of notation, we will sometimes write e.g. 2 instead of s(s(0)), 〈x; y; z〉 instead
of 〈x; 〈y; z〉〉, or {x; y}z instead of {〈x; y〉}z.
We will sometimes use unary predicate symbols instead of sort names in order to
explicitly state the sort of a variable. For instance, we may write Agent(x), expressing
that x is of sort Agent (other authors use the notation x : Agent). Such unary predicate
symbols can only be used with variable arguments. Though this is not used in the
present paper, note that the deBnition of such unary symbols is a tree automaton [12],
hence their least Herbrand interpretation is a recognizable set of trees.
2.2. Protocol independent clauses
We sketch here and in the following section how to design a set of Horn clauses
deBning valid traces. We also show in [13] that this is a reasonable deBnition since
other models can be reduced to this one.
We use a binary predicate symbol I to describe the intruder knowledge. I takes two
arguments: a message m and a trace t; I(m; t) means that message m is known to
the intruder after executing t. The Brst clauses describe the initial knowledge of the
intruder, the second ones describe his ability to analyze and synthesize messages, the
third ones his ability to learn new messages.
Initial knowledge
Agent(x) ⇒ I(x; t) The intruder knows all agent ids.
Agent(x) ⇒ I(pub(x); t) The intruder knows all public keys.
Da(x)
Da(x)
⇒
⇒
I(prv(x); t)
I(shr(x); t)
The intruder knows all keys of com-
promised agents..
Analysis and synthesis
I(x; t); I(y; t) ⇒ I(〈x; y〉; t) The intruder can compose mes-
sages.
I(x; t); I(y; t) ⇒ I({x}y; t) The intruder can encrypt a knownmessage with a known key.
I({x}pub(y); t); I(prv(y); t)
I({x}prv(y); t); I(pub(y); t)
I({x}y; t); I(y; t);Sym(y)
⇒
⇒
⇒
I(x; t)
I(x; t)
I(x; t)
The intruder can retrieve the clear
text of an encrypted message when
he knows the inverse of the key.
The predicate Sym is deBned in Fig. 1.
Interception and memorization
T ([x; s] · t) ⇒ I(x; [x; s] · t) All messages sent through the net-
work are available to the intruder.
I(x; t) ⇒ I(x; y · t) The intruder remembers a message
whatever is added to the trace.
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Fig. 1. DeBnitions of the auxiliary predicates.
Protocol independent clauses also contain the deBnition of some auxiliary predicates,
which are described in Fig. 1 as well as the clause T (⊥), which states that the empty
trace is a trace. How to continue a trace is protocol-dependent.
2.3. Protocol-dependent clauses
We describe here how to deBne the set of valid traces T on the Yahalom protocol
(see e.g. [8] for a description and further references). This protocol aims at establishing
a session key between two agents, using a trusted server. In this section, a; b will stand
for variables of sort Agent, x; y; z; m for variables of sort Message, s, t and e for
variables of sort respectively Num, Trace and Event.
A → B : A; Na;
B → S : B; {A; Na; Nb}shr(B);
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S → A : {B; Kab; Na; Nb}shr(A); {A; Kab}shr(B);
A → B : {A; Kab}shr(B); {Nb}Kab :
We Brst state that, at any point, we may start a new session of the protocol assigning
roles to any of the agents. This is expressed by
Fresh(t; s); T (t)⇒ T ( [st(a; 1; 1; 〈a; b; srv〉); s]
· [st(b; 2; 1; 〈b; srv〉); s]
· [st(srv; 3; 1; srv); s] · t):
Fresh is an auxiliary predicate (deBned in Fig. 1), which holds when the number s is
larger than any number occurring in t. Then the trace t can be extended accordingly.
Now, if a has started a session s, and if she has not already sent the Brst message
of this session, she can do it, hence extending the trace, and moving to stage 2 for
this session:
T (t);
In([st(a; 1; 1; 〈a; b; srv〉); s]; t);
NotPlayed(a; 2; s; t)

⇒
T ( [〈a; n1(a; s)〉; s]
·[st(a; 1; 2; 〈a; b; srv; n1(a; b; s)〉); s]
·t):
This uses the auxiliary predicates In and NotPlayed which are intended to be respec-
tively the membership test on traces and a test that this step has not already been
completed for the same session (see Fig. 1 for complete deBnitions).
Finally, let us describe how the last step of the protocol is translated: we require a to
have completed the Brst step and assume that she receives a message of the expected
form. This message may be forged by the intruder: we do not include receive events
in the trace since messages that are possibly received are identical to messages that
can be forged by the intruder.
T (t);
In([u1; s]; t);
NotPlayed(a; 3; s; t);
I(〈{b; x; n1(a; b; s); y}shr(a); z〉; t)

⇒ T ([〈z; {y}x〉; s] · [u2; s] · t);
where u1 = st(a; 1; 2; 〈a; b; srv; n1(a; b; s)〉) and u2 = st(a; 1; 3; 〈a; b; srv; n1(a; b; s); x〉).
2.4. The model
Now, we assume deBned the sets of Horn clauses CI ;CD for the protocol independent
clauses and the protocol dependent clauses. For a protocol P, we let CP be CI ∪CD.
We assume that CP does not contain negative clauses (i.e. we only specify what is
possible). Then CP has a least Herbrand model HP .
Denition 1. A valid trace for the protocol P is a member of the interpretation of T
in HP .
58 H. Comon-Lundh, V. Cortier / Science of Computer Programming 50 (2004) 51–71
2.5. Attacks
Let  be the security property that we want to check. We assume that  can be
expressed as a clause using the primitives described in previous sections. This is not
a strong restriction since, at least the trace properties can be expressed in this way
(and possibly other properties which relate diPerent traces), as shown by the following
examples.
Example 1. We can express that u(x; y; s) (or u(x; y) if we want to express the secrecy
of a constant data) is a (long term) secret shared by x and y by
(∀t; x; y; s):¬T (t) ∨ ¬Ha(x) ∨ ¬Ha(y) ∨ ¬I(u(x; y; s); t);
which means that, in any trace t, if x and y are honest agents, then u(x; y; s) is unknown
to the intruder.
Example 2. We can express that u(x; y; s) is a short term secret. The intruder does not
know u(x; y; s) as long as session s is not completed for the agent x playing the Brst
role:
(∀t; x; y; s):¬T (t) ∨ ¬Ha(x) ∨ ¬Ha(y) ∨ ¬I(u(x; y; s); t) ∨ ¬NotPlayed(x; 1; 3; s; t):
If we assume that the last message of the protocol is sent by x, then we express here
that, in any trace t, if x and y are honest agents, then u(x; y; s) is unknown to the
intruder unless the session is already completed.
Example 3. We can express an authentication property: if x receives the message
m(x; y; s), then it has been sent previously by y: (∀t; x; y; s)
¬T (t) ∨ ¬Ha(x) ∨ ¬Ha(y) ∨ ¬I(m(x; y; s); t) ∨ In([st(y; 2; 2; m(x; y; s)); s]; t):
Denition 2. A protocol P satises a property  iP HP |=.
Dually, there is an attack when HP |=. In such a case (by compactness), there is
a Bnite subset H0 of HP such that H0 |=:
Denition 3. An attack on P for  is a Bnite subset H0 of HP such that H0 |=.
H0 is an attack with n agents if there are at most n distinct terms of sorts Agent
in H0.
For instance, if the property  is a “trace property”, H0 may contain a single
predicate T (t) where t is a Bnite trace which violates the property.
2.6. Relevance of the model
The model we present here is actually an extension of the Millen–RueO model [24,14]
(hereafter referred to as the MR model), expressed in Horn clauses. The MR model is
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itself inspired from Paulson’s model [27] and from the strand spaces [31]. Formally,
we proved in [13] that for each protocol of the MR model, we can associate a Bnite
set of Horn clauses CP and a Bnite set of purely negative clauses P such that P is
insecure if and only if there is an attack on CP for some ∈P . Such a reduction
preserves the number of agents involved in the attack [13].
3. Reduction to a xed number of agents
We are now ready to state and prove our reduction results. In Section 3.1, we prove
that for secrecy properties, it is su"cient to consider two agents. In Section 3.2, we
extend this result when an agent is disallowed to speak to herself and/or for more
general security properties like authentication.
3.1. From n agents to two agents
In this section, we consider purely negative properties, which easily encompass se-
crecy, but do not encompass authentication in a natural way. We will discuss this in
Section 3.2. We show that if there is an attack with n agents, then we can construct
an attack with two agents: given an attack using n agents, we project every honest
identity on a single honest identity and every dishonest identity on a single dishonest
identity. Since protocols and properties do not rely on internal agents representations,
we obtain a valid attack using only two agents. This projection uses the fact that our
model allows an agent to speak to herself, which is the case of most of the models
for cryptographic protocols [24,31,19,6,16,4]. However, a similar result holds even if
an agent is disallowed to speak to herself (see Section 3.2).
We emphasize that our result holds for any model of protocols which do not make
use of our internal representation of agent ids (which is the case of any model we
know). More precisely:
Denition 4. A set of clauses C is admissible if it does not use the symbols sh; sd.
A clause is said purely negative if it only contains negative literals.
The clauses which were proposed in the previous sections are admissible. Further-
more, any protocol speciBcation cannot use our particular representation of names,
hence it is always represented as an admissible set of clauses.
Theorem 1. Let CP be an admissible set of clauses. Let  be a purely negative
admissible clause. If there is an attack of P for , using n agents, then there is an
attack using (at most) two agents.
Proof. We Brst introduce some notations. Let M be the set of messages, T be the set
of all positive ground literals, and  g be the set of mappings from variables to ground
terms, which are compatible with the sort constraints.
Given a Horn clause c=B1(x); : : : ; Bn(x)⇒A(x) where B1(x); : : : ; Bn(x); A(x) are
positive literals whose free variables are contained in x, and a subset S of T, we
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deBne c(S) as follows:
c(S) def= {A(x)# | # ∈  g;∀i; Bi(x)# ∈S}:
Then, the immediate consequence relation FC is the mapping from 2T to 2T de-
Bned by
FC(S)
def= S ∪
⋃
c∈C
c(S):
For simplicity, we will write FP for the mapping FCP .
It is well-known that the set of positive literals H+P of the least Herbrand model
HP is the least Bxed point of FP:
H+P =
+∞⋃
k=1
FkP(∅):
For every L∈H0 there is a minimal index nL such that L∈FnLP (∅).
We deBne now the projection function: we map every honest agent to h and every
dishonest agent to d: for every literal L, let RL be the literal L in which every maximal
subterm of sort Ha is replaced with h and every maximal subterm of sort Da is replaced
with d:
f(t1; : : : ; tn)
def= f(t1; : : : ; tn) If f =∈ {sh; sd};
sh(t)
def= h;
sd(t)
def= d:
Our proof relies on the following lemma which ensures that if a positive literal is in
HP then its projection is also in HP .
Lemma 1. If L is a positive literal of HP , then RL is in HP .
This is proved by induction on nL. If nL =0, there is no literal such that nL =0 thus
there is nothing to prove.
Suppose the property true for nl6n and consider a positive literal L of HP such
that nL = n+1. There exists a clause cL and positive literals L1; : : : ; Lk ∈H+P such that
L∈ cL({L1; : : : ; Lk}) with nLi6n for all 16i6k. By induction hypothesis, L1; : : : ; Lk ∈
H+P . In addition, cL is on the form B1(x); : : : ; Bk(x)⇒A(x) with L=A(x)#, Li=B1(x)#
for some #∈ g. Since cL is an admissible clause, it does not contains the symbols sh
and sd thus RL=A(x) R# and Li =B1(x) R#. Hence, RL∈ cL({L1; : : : Lk) and RL∈H+P .
We are now ready to complete the proof. Assume that H0 is a Bnite subset of HP
such that H0 |=. Since  is assumed to be purely negative, we may assume w.l.o.g.
that H0 only contains positive literals.
Let H1 = { RL |L∈H0}. The set H1 is still Bnite and, by lemma 1, H1⊂HP . Let
us show that H1 |=. Let # an instance of  falsiBed by H0. Then # is falsiBed
by H1. Since  is an admissible clause #= R#, thus H1 |=.
Actually, this theorem does not hold when  may contain positive literals.
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Example 4. Let CP be
Da(x) ⇒ A(x; y)
Da(y) ⇒ A(x; y)
⇒ A(x; x)
and  be A(x; y). ¬A(h; sh(h)) is an attack and there is no attack with a single honest
agent.
We will consider in Section 3.2 an extension of Theorem 1 for formulas containing
positive literals.
3.2. Extensions of our reduction result
Disallowing an agent to speak with herself
In the last section, we used the ability for an agent to speak with herself, which was
not explicitly ruled out by the speciBcation. There are however examples in which the
existence of an attack relies on this ability:
Example 5. Consider the following “toy” example where an agent A sends a secret to
an agent B:
A → B : {A; B; Na}pub(B); {secret}{A;A;Na}pub(B) :
B is able to build the compound key {A; A; Na}pub(B) and gets the secret. One can show
that Na will remain unknown to the intruder, thus {A; A; Na}pub(B) is unknown to the
intruder unless A=B. Thus, this protocol is Sawed only if an honest agent sends a
secret to herself.
We are now considering explicitly disallowing such self-conversations between hon-
est agents. Still, a dishonest agent is enabled to speak with himself, which actually
does not bring any new information to the intruder (see Remark 1). Following this,
we add a predicate symbol Distinct deBned by the set of clauses:
C=
def=


Distinct(x; y);Ha(x);Ha(y) ⇒ Distinct(sh(x); sh(y))
Ha(x) ⇒ Distinct(h; sh(x))
Ha(x);Da(y) ⇒ Distinct(x; y)
Distinct(x; y) ⇒ Distinct(y; x)
Da(x);Da(y) ⇒ Distinct(x; y)
The least Herbrand model of Distinct consists of pairs (skh (h); s
m
d (d)), (s
m
d (d); s
k
h (h)),
(smd (d); s
k
d(d)) and (s
i
h(h); s
j
h(h)) with i = j.
We redeBne the notion of an admissible clause:
Denition 5. A clause  is admissible if
•  does not contain the symbols sh; sd,
• Distinct occurs only negatively in .
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We can specify that the sender a is distinct from the (expected) receiver b with
admissible clauses: it su"ces to add negative literals Distinct(a; b). Note however
that such a property is not expressible in e.g. the Millen–RueO model. The proto-
col model HP is now the least Herbrand model of C = ∪CP . All other deBnitions are
unchanged.
Remark 1. If we want to specify that an agent is not allowed to speak with herself,
even for dishonest agents, we can introduce a predicate Distinct whose semantic is
exactly the pairs of distinct agents. In this case, an admissible clause should also
verify that Distinct occurs at most once, which is su"cient to express that an agent is
not allowed to speak to herself. In addition, the protocol has to verify that the message
exchanges between two compromised agents does not increase the intruder knowledge,
which is the case of all “real” protocols [8]. This leads to a speciBcation which can
be reduced to the one above.
More general security properties
Theorem 1 assumes that  is purely negative, which is necessary according to Ex-
ample 4.
We have seen in Section 2.5 that such a restriction to negative properties is not
a problem for secrecy. On the other hand, an authentication property (non-injective
agreement) is naturally expressed as
¬T (t) ∨ ¬Ha(x) ∨ ¬Ha(y) ∨ ¬I(m(x; y; s); t) ∨ In([st(x; m(x; y; s)); s]; t);
which involves a positive literal. However, it is still possible to handle such proper-
ties. Let us extend the deBnition of admissible security properties to a class which
encompasses authentication and secrecy properties.
Denition 6. A clause  is an admissible security property if  is admissible and if
 is of the form
C ∨ In(u1; t1) ∨ · · · ∨ In(un; tn);
where C is a purely negative clause, t1; : : : ; tn; u1; : : : ; un are terms.
Reduction result
Our reduction result will now depend on the security property under consideration:
if the property  uses k distinct agents variables then if there is an attack, there is an
attack with (at most) k + 1 agents.
Theorem 2. Assume CP is an admissible set of clauses, which does not contain any
variable of sort Ha, and  an admissible security property. If there is an attack on
P for  using n agents, then there is an attack on P for  using at most k1 + k2 + 1
agents, where k1 is the number of variables of sort Ha occurring in  and k2 is the
number of variables of sort Agent which are not of subsort Ha, occurring in the
positive literals of .
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Note that disallowing variables of sort Ha in CP is not a real restriction. Indeed,
the speciBcation of the protocol itself (CD) should not distinguish between honest and
dishonest agents. Moreover, the intruder capabilities (CI ) should not depend on speciBc
honest agents: an intruder knows all the public information of honest agents and the
private information of dishonest agents only.
Proof. We keep the notations of the proof of Theorem 1. This new reduction result is
proved in two steps: Brst, we reduce  to a purely negative clause and then we use a
projection function to get our result.
First step:  is of the form C ∨ In(u1; t1)∨ · · · ∨ In(un; tn). We deBne a predicate
I˜n whose interpretation will coincide with the complement of the interpretation of In
in HP . This could be performed using general techniques such as in [5,9]. We give
however here a direct deBnition:
]Trace(x) ⇒ I˜n(y; x);
]Event(x) ⇒ I˜n([x; s]; y);
]Num(x) ⇒ I˜n([x; s]; y);
⇒ I˜n(x;⊥);
I˜n(x; y);Diﬀ(x; z) ⇒ I˜n(x; y · z):
]Trace; ]Event; ]Num are deBned by complementation of tree automata: their interpretation
coincides with the complement of Trace; Event and Num, respectively in HP . Diff is
deBned by the following clauses:
⇒ Diﬀ(f(x1; : : : ; xn); g(y1; : : : ; yk)) ∀f = g
Diﬀ(xi; yi) ⇒ Diﬀ(f(x1; : : : ; xn); f(x1; : : : ; xn)) 16 i 6 n:
We let C¬ be these additional clauses. Note that C¬ is not an admissible set of
clauses but we show in the second step of the proof that we can still handle such
clauses since they are not used elsewhere in the protocol clauses.
Let HP; be the least Herbrand model of CP ∪C = ∪C¬. It contains HP (since all
clauses in C¬ are headed with predicate symbols which do not occur in any clause
of CP ∪C =). Moreover, for every ground terms u; t, HP; |= I˜n(u; t) iP HP |= In(u; t).
Indeed, the interpretation of Diff in HP; is the set of pairs of distinct ground terms.
Next, the interpretations of I˜n and In in HP; have an empty intersection: we prove
this result by contradiction and by induction on the minimal index n such that both
In(s; t) and I˜n(s; t) belong to FnP;(∅). Finally, every pair of terms (s; t) is either
in the interpretation of In or in the interpretation of I˜n, by induction on the
size |s|+ |t|.
Second step: Projection. Let  def=C ∨¬I˜n(u1; t1)∨ · · · ∨¬I˜n(un; tn) and assume there
exists a ground substitution ) such that HP |=). Then HP; |=  ). Now, since  ) is
purely negative, there is a Bnite subset C0 of ground instances of CP ∪C = ∪C¬ such
that C0 |=L for every literal ¬L occurring in  ).
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We let H0 be the set of (positive) literals deBned by
H0 = {P(t1; : : : ; tm) ∈HP; | P = I˜n; P = Diﬀ ;C0 |= P(t1; : : : ; tm)}
∪ {I˜n(ui); t) ∈HP; | i ∈ {1; : : : ; n};C0 |= I˜n(ui); t)}
∪ {Diﬀ(ui); t) ∈HP; | i ∈ {1; : : : ; n};C0 |= Diﬀ(ui); t)}:
Since C0 is a set of Horn clauses, for L∈H0, there is an integer nL and a clause
CL ∈C0 such that L∈FnLC0 (∅), L =∈FnL−1C0 (∅), CL =¬L1 ∨ · · · ∨¬Lk∨L, L1; : : : ; Lk ∈FnL−1C0
(∅). With such deBnitions, H0 has the following properties:
• H0 is a Bnite subset of HP;
• H0 falsiBes  )
• because of the form of the clauses deBning I˜n, for every L∈H0, if CL =¬L1∨· · ·∨
¬Lk ∨L, then either L1; : : : ; Lk ∈H0, or else L=Diff(ui); t).
Let us now deBne the projection. If x1; : : : xk1 are the variables of sort Ha in  , we let
sm1h (h); : : : ; s
mp
h (h) be the set {x1); : : : ; xk1)} with m1¡ · · ·¡mp (p6k1). If y1; : : : yk2
are the variables of ui; ti, of sort Agent but not of subsort Ha, we let s
n1
d (d); : : : ; s
mq
d (d)
be the set {y1); : : : ; yk2)} with n1¡ · · ·¡nq (q6k2). Next, we deBne the projection
function as follows:
f(t1; : : : ; tn)
def= f(t1; : : : ; tn) if f(t1; : : : ; tn) is not of sort Ha or Da;
smih (h)
def= si−1h (h) for i = 1; : : : ; p;
snid (d)
def= si−1d (d) for i = 1; : : : ; q;
Rt def= sqd(d) otherwise:
Again, we let H1 = { RL |L∈H0} and we are going to prove that H1⊆HP; and H1
falsiBes  R). This will conclude the proof since consideringH′1 the setH1 where the lit-
erals I˜n(ui; ti)) are replaced with ¬In(ui; ti)), we haveH′1 ⊆HP sinceHP |=¬In(ui; ti))
iP HP; |= I˜n(ui; ti)) from the Brst part of the proof. Moreover H′1 falsiBes  R), thus
H′1 will be an attack with p+ q+1 agents: d; sd(d); : : : ; s
q
d(d); h; sh(h); : : : ; s
p−1
h (h),
p+ q6k1 + k2.
Actually, with the three following lemmas, the proof that H1⊆HP; is similar to
the proof of Theorem 1:
Lemma 2. For every ground terms g1; g2, if Distinct(g1; g2)∈FnP;(∅), then
Distinct(g1; g2)∈FnP;(∅).
Proof. We may assume n¿0. Let ti = xi). Then there are three possible situations (let
us recall that Distinct only occurs positively in C =):
• if g1; g2 =∈{t1; : : : ; tk}, then using that the least Herbrand model of Distinct consists
of pairs (sk(h); sm(d)), (sm(d); sk(h)), (sm(d); sk(d)) and (si(h); sj(h)) with i = j, we
have that Distinct(g1; g2)=Distinct(d; d)∈FP;(∅);
• if g1 ∈{t1; : : : ; tk} and g2 =∈{t1; : : : ; tk} (or the converse), then Distinct(g1; g2)=
Distinct(sjh(h); d) (or Distinct(d; s
j
h(h))), which also belongs to FP;(∅);
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• if g1; g2 ∈{t1; : : : ; tk}: g1 = smih (h); g2 = smjh (h) with i = j, then
Distinct(g1; g2)=Distinct(sih(h); s
j
h(h))∈F | j−i|P; (∅). In this last case, |j− i|6|mj−mi|
by construction, hence the result.
Lemma 3. For every i=1; : : : ; n, for every term t, if Diff(ui); t)∈HP; then Diff(ui); t)
∈HP;.
Proof. By construction of the predicate Diff, we have Diff(u; v)∈HP; if and only if
u = v. Thus it is su"cient to show that ui R)= Rt implies ui)= t. Assume ui R)= Rt. Since
the variables of ui, which are of sort Agent, are contained in {x1; : : : xk1}∪ {y1; : : : yk2},
the maximal subterms of ui) of sort Agent belong to
A
def= {sm1h (h); : : : ; smph (h); sn1d (d); : : : ; smqd (d)};
thus the maximal subterms of ui R) of sort Agent belong to
{d; sd(d); : : : ; sq−1d (d); h; sh(h); : : : ; sp−1h (h)}:
Assume t contains a maximal subterm of sort Agent, which does not belong to A,
then one of the maximal subterms of sort Agent of Rt is sqd(d). Thus ui R) and Rt cannot
be equal. Consequently, the maximal subterms of t of sort Agent belong to A. Since
the function · is injective on A, we get ui)= t.
Lemma 4. If ]Trace(t)∈HP; (resp. ]Event(t), resp. ]Num(t)) then ]Trace(Rt)∈HP;
(resp. ]Event(Rt), resp. ]Num(Rt)).
Proof (Sketch). In every state of a minimal deterministic tree automaton accepting
]Trace, either all terms of sort Agent are accepted or no term of sort Agent is accepted.
As in Theorem 1, we prove now that, if L∈H0, then RL∈HP;. This is proved by
induction on nL. If nL =0, there is nothing to prove. Otherwise, let CL =¬L1 ∨ · · ·
∨¬Lk ∨L. By property of H0, either L=Diff(ui); t), in which case we conclude using
Lemma 3, or else L1; : : : ; Lk ∈H0. Then, by induction hypothesis, L1; : : : ; Lk ∈HP;.
Moreover, CL =C# for some clause C ∈CP ∪C = ∪C¬. If C ∈CP , as in the proof
of Theorem 1, CL =C R# and we conclude that RL∈HP;. If C ∈C =, L is of the form
Distinct(g1; g2) and we conclude using Lemma 2. Finally, if C ∈C¬, either L= ]Trace(t)
(resp. ]Event(t), resp. ]Num(t)) and we conclude using Lemma 4, or else C is one of
the clauses deBning I˜n. However, since sh; sd do not occur in these clauses, C#=C R#
and we can simply apply the induction hypothesis.
This shows that H1⊆HP;, hence concludes the proof as noticed above.
Remark. Note that our reduction result strongly depends on the fact that the negation
of the predicate In can also be expressed by a set of Horn clauses.
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3.3. Discussion on the bound k1 + k2 + 1
We show here that the bound k1 + k2 + 1 can be reached for some protocols P and
some properties  when k1 = 1 or k2 = 0. We have not built examples in the general
case (when k1 =1; k2 =0) because it seemed technical but we are convinced that it
could be obtained by a combination of the two following examples.
Example 6 (bound k1 + 1 when k2 = 0). Let k¿2. Consider the following protocol,
inspired from the Needham–Schroeder public key protocol. a1; : : : ; ak are variables of
sort Agent.
Let u= 〈a1; : : : ; ak〉.
Initialization
Fresh(t; s); T (t)⇒ T ([st(a1; 1; u); s] · [st(a2; 1; a2); s] · · · · · [st(ak ; 1; ak); s] · t):
First message: A1→A2 : {A1; A2; : : : ; Ak ; NA1}pub(A2), Ai =Aj, for i = j.
T (t);Distinct(ai; aj) i = j
In([st(a1; 1; u); s]; t);
NotPlayed(a1; 2; s; t)

⇒
T ( [{u; n1(a1; : : : ; ak ; s)}pub(a2); s]
·[st(a1; 2; 〈u; n1(a1; : : : ; ak ; s)〉); s]
·t):
Second message: A2→A1 : {NA1 ; NA2}pub(A1)
T (t);Distinct(ai; aj) i = j
I({u; x}pub(a2); t)
In([st(a2; 1; a2); s]; t);
NotPlayed(a2; 2; s; t)

⇒
T ( [{x; n2(a1; : : : ; ak ; s)}pub(a1); s]
·[st(a2; 2; 〈u; n2(a1; : : : ; ak ; s)〉); s]
·t):
Third message: A1→A2 : {NA2}pub(A2)
T (t); I({n1(a1; : : : ; ak ; s); y}pub(a1); t)
In([st(a1; 2; 〈u; n〉); s]; t);
NotPlayed(a2; 3; s; t)

⇒
T ( [{y}pub(a1); s]
·[st(a1; 3; 〈u; n; y〉); s]
·t);
where n= n1(a1; : : : ; ak ; s).
We could also add some other rules to make the roles of a3; : : : ; ak less Bctitious.
We consider the property:
 = ¬Ha(x1) ∨ · · · ∨ ¬Ha(xk) ∨ ¬I(n2(x1; : : : ; xk ; s); t):
Then, following the attack described by Lowe [22], there is an attack on , using k+1
agent id’s. Let us sketch why every attack on  uses at least k+1 agent id’s. Assume
there is an attack, then there exist t; s; a1; : : : ; ak such that I(n2(a1; : : : ; ak ; s); t)∈HP
where HP is the least Herbrand model and a1; : : : ; ak are honest agents. Since a2
produces n2(a1; : : : ; ak ; s) only if Distinct(ai; aj) for i = j holds and since a1; : : : ; ak
are honest agents, we have that a1; : : : ; ak are distinct. In addition, if no dishonest
identity is used, then the intruder cannot decrypt any message thus he cannot obtain
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n2(a1; : : : ; ak ; s). Consequently, at least one compromised identity has been used, thus
at least k + 1 identities have been used for the attack.
Example 7 (bound k2 + 1 when k1 = 1). Let k¿2. Consider the following toy proto-
col:
A1 → A2 : {A1; : : : ; Ak+1}prv(A1);
⋃
{i1 ; : : : ; ik+1} ⊂ {1; : : : ; k + 1}
|#{i1 ; : : : ; ik+1} 6 1
〈Ai1 ; : : : ;¡ Aik ; Aik+1〉:
The agent A sends an authentication message {A1; : : : ; Ak+1}prv(A1) and all possible
k + 1-tuples of agents names where at least two agent’s name are equal. This can be
encoded by one single clause:
T (t);Fresh(t; s)⇒ T

[{a1; : : : ; ak+1}prv(a)] ·
⋃
{i1 ; : : : ; ik+1} ⊂ {1; : : : ; k + 1}
|#{i1 ; : : : ; ik+1} 6 k
[¡ ai1 ; : : : ; 〈aik ; aik+1〉; s] · t

 ;
where a1; : : : ; ak+1 are variables of sort Agent and #S denotes the cardinal of a set S.
To reach the bound k2 of Theorem 2, the important part is the choice of the security
property. Consider:
 = ¬Ha(x) ∨ ¬Agent(y1) ∨ · · · ∨ ¬Agent(yk) ∨ ¬I ( {x; y1; : : : ; yk}prv(x); t)
∨In(〈x; y1; : : : ; yk〉; t):
Then, using the notation of Theorem 2, k1 = 1 and k2 = k. To obtain an attack, there
must be a trace t where the intruder is able to know a message of the form
{a1; : : : ; ak+1}prv(a1), where a1 is an honest agent identity. This means that the clause
) must has been used for some ground substitution ), since the other clauses do not
allow the intruder to encrypt with an honest private key. Assume the {x); y1); : : : ; yk)}
contains less than k + 1 elements. Then, by construction of the clauses, the tuple
〈x); y1); : : : ; yk)〉 is in the trace t, thus we do not have an attack. Consequently, to
have an attack, we need at least k + 1= k2 + k1 agents.
4. Limitations
In this section, we discuss about limitations of our reduction results. First, it does not
hold for security properties expressed as observational equivalence. Secondly, as stated
in the Introduction, it does not imply any reduction result on the number of sessions.
We actually show that an arbitrary number of interleaved sessions can be necessary to
obtain a secret data.
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4.1. Observational equivalence
Secrecy properties may be expressed using reachability properties but may also be
deBned using observational equivalence. For example, in spi-calculus [1], a protocol
P(z) preserves the secrecy of z if for any terms M and M ′, the protocols P(M) and
P(M ′) are barbed equivalent (denoted by P(M)∼=P(M ′)), i.e. if for any process O,
the processes P(M) |O and P(M ′) |O are weakly bisimilar. Intuitively, P(z) preserves
the secrecy of z if an observer cannot tell the diPerence between P(M) and P(M ′).
We will not deBne here the semantics of the spi-calculus and the barbed equivalence,
the reader is referred to [1] for precise deBnitions.
For such properties, our method does not work: the weak bisimilarity is not sta-
ble by projection on agent identities. Indeed, we may have P(M)∼=P(M ′) while
P(M) ∼=P(M ′) or conversely. This means that the study of secrecy in this case cannot
be restricted to processes with a Bxed and Bnite number of agents. Finding a sub-
class of processes in spi-calculus for which a similar reduction result holds is an open
problem.
4.2. An unbounded number of sessions
Our result does not give any bound on the number of sessions. On the contrary, it is
easy to see that an arbitrary number of interleaved sessions can be needed to obtain a
secret, using the Post Correspondence Problem (PCP). The encoding we present here
is inspired by the encoding given by Michael Rusinowitch (private communication) to
show the undecidability of secrecy for general cryptographic protocols.
Let  a Bnite alphabet and (ui; vi)16i6n; ui; vi ∈ ∗ an instance of PCP. We build
the following protocol:
A→ B : {〈0; 0〉; 0}Kab ;
B→ A : {〈0; 0〉; Nb}Kab ;
A : {〈0; 0〉; z}Kab → B : {〈0; 0〉; {z}Na}Kab ;
B→ A : {〈0; 0〉; {z}Na}Kab ;
A : {〈x; y〉; {z}Na}Kab → B : {〈xui; yvi〉; z′}Kab ; {s}{〈xui ;xui〉;0}Kab 16 i 6 n:
Kab is a private key between two honest agents A and B, unknown to the intruder. The
protocol encodes PCP. In addition, we have added a “counter” which ensures that as
many sessions as the number of couples of words needed for the solution, have to be
opened at the same time. All messages exchanged between honest agents are of the
form {〈u; v〉; t}Kab , an intruder is not able to decrypt or modify them and the term t
represents a nonce successively encrypted by other nonces. Let nt denotes the number
of encryption symbols used in t.
The second rule of the agent A consists in incrementing the number of encryption
symbols. Note that this rule can be played only if the terms u and v are both equal
to zero, i.e., the intruder has not started to build a solution. Conversely, each time
the agent A plays his last rule, the number of encryption has to be decremented. To
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simulate a solution of PCP for this instance, we have to proceed in the following
way:
• opening as many sessions between A and B as the number of couples of words
needed for the solution,
• then successively in each session, letting A playing his second rule by forwarding
in the session i + 1 the message obtained from A in the session i,
• eventually, playing successively, but in the reverse order of the sessions, the last
rule of A by forwarding only the part corresponding the couple of word needed to
build the solution at this step.
One can show by induction that, on the Brst hand, the secret s is revealed if and
only if the instance (ui; vi)16i6n of PCP has a solution and, on the second hand, an
attack needs at least k parallel sessions where k is the number of couples of words of
(ui; vi)16i6n used to construct the smallest solution w:
w = u(1) · · · u(n) = v(1) · · · v(n):
Our proof is quite informal here, but it could be easily formalized in most models of
cryptographic protocols.
5. Conclusions
We have shown that it is possible to restrict the number of agents without loss of
generality: security properties which fail in an unbounded network, also fail in a small
limited network. This does not assume any property of the protocols.
To prove a security property for some protocol P, it is therefore su"cient to consider
Bnitely many instances of the roles of P, typically 2n where n is the number of roles in
P (or (k + 1)n for authentication properties or if we do not allow an agent to be both
the sender and the receiver of a message). These numbers are small since n=2 for
most protocols (sometimes n=3). They can be further lowered since sessions involving
only dishonest agents are not relevant.
This reduction result also provides a decision result if we assume a passive attacker,
i.e. an attacker who may only analyze the messages sent on the net but who cannot
forge and send new messages. Indeed, in the presence of such an attacker (or eaves-
dropper), we can also assume that an agent cannot confuse messages from diPerent
sessions: it su"ces to label the messages by a session nonce and the rule number
(which is often the case for implemented protocols). Thus, there is no need to con-
sider interleaving of sessions. In addition, given a set of messages S and a message
m, deciding whether the intruder may deduce m from S is in PTIME (side result of
[2]). Since our reduction result ensures that only a Bnite number of agents have to be
considered, we conclude that secrecy is decidable in EXP(n)× PTIME(s) where n is
the number of roles of the protocol and s is the size of the protocol.
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